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Short term trading is necessary to the functioning 
of European commercial banks and asset man-
agement firms. Given the importance of these 
institutions, it follows that a tax that restrains all 
such trading would undermine the European fi-
nancial system’s ability to service the real econo-
my. It is better to allow financial institutions to per-
form their functions unhindered and tax any 
excessive profits made out of the performance of 
those functions.
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1. Introduction
In late September, 2011, the European Commission pro-
posed that a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) be the pre-
ferred method by which European governments should 
tax their financial systems to recoup some of the losses 
incurred in the financial crisis of 2007-08.1 Although the 
Commission’s staff also studied the merits of a Financial 
Activities Tax (FAT), which is a tax on the profits and 
wages of financial institutions rather than a tax on trans-
actions in the financial markets, the EC finally decided 
in favour of the FTT on the grounds that it would both 
generate revenue for governments and help to stabilize the 
financial markets by curbing trading volumes. In making 
this proposal, the Commission effectively made clear its 
endorsement of the premise that as all short term trading 
is purely speculative it can only be central to the functions 
of institutions that are peripheral to the financial system 
and only peripheral to the functions of institutions that 
are central to the system. 
This paper contests the above premise. While it ac-
cepts that some short term trading in the money and capi-
tal markets is speculative and thus potentially destabiliz-
ing, it also argues that other parts of short term trading 
are necessary to the day-to-day activities of commercial 
banks and asset management firms. In view of the impor-
tance of commercial banks and institutional asset manag-
ers to the European financial system, it follows that the 
introduction of a European FTT that indiscriminately 
restrains all short term trading would bring about a result 
that is the very opposite of that intended by the Commis-
sion. Rather than enhance the ability of the European 
financial system to service the real economy in a stable 
and cost efficient manner, the proposed tax would on the 
contrary severely undermine that ability. The conclusion 
drawn here is that it would be far better to allow im-
portant financial institutions to perform their functions 
unhindered and then tax any excessive profits made out 
of the performance of those functions.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section two 
reviews the reasons behind the Commission’s choice of a 
transactions tax. Section three focuses on the effects of a 
capital market FTT on European asset managers. Section 
four focuses on the effects of a money market FTT on 
European banks. Section five looks at some implications. 
Section six concludes.
2. The Rationale for a European FTT
As a result of the extensive damage to domestic econo-
mies and public finances wrought by the financial crisis, 
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a number of European governments introduced special 
tax measures aimed at repairing the state’s fiscal posi-
tion and making the financial sector bear some of the 
costs of the crisis. Fearing that the lack of coordination 
of these national measures could fragment the European 
internal market for financial services, the European 
Council and the European Parliament called upon the 
European Commission to prepare a proposal for a com-
mon approach to taxing the financial sector2. In response 
to these calls the Commission authorised several studies 
that compared the relative advantages of two major types 
of tax instrument, the Financial Activities Tax that would 
be levied on the value added by financial institutions and 
the Financial Transactions Tax that would target trad-
ing activity in the financial markets3. Although at one 
point it looked as though the FAT would be favoured4, 
the Commission finally decided in favour of the FTT on 
the grounds that not only would this tax be marginally 
more effective in achieving the revenue raising objective 
but also that it alone would be able to achieve the second 
major objective of „limiting undesirable behaviour and 
thus stabilizing markets“ (EC 2011b, 3). Central to this 
conclusion is the identification of ‘undesirable behaviour’ 
with ‘trading behaviour’: while the FTT would have a 
directly negative impact on trading volumes by raising 
the cost of financial transactions, the FAT would have 
no equivalent impact. As the Commission’s Impact As-
sessment states: „The FAT does not have a direct impact on 
the trading behaviour in financial markets“ (EC 2011, 6) 
The controversy that has followed the proposal for a 
European financial transactions tax has centred on two 
broad issues, feasibility and desirability. The strong ob-
jections to the FTT voiced by some European govern-
ments have served to highlight the risk that if Europe 
proceeds with the FTT without any global agreement to 
implement the tax a substantial proportion of financial 
trades currently conducted in Europe will be redirected 
to untaxed jurisdictions and markets. In an earlier work-
ing paper on financial sector taxation the Commission’s 
staff conceded the point that if a transactions tax „is not 
introduced on the global scale it has the potential to divert 
economic activity ..therefore... the tax has to be as compre-
hensive as possible“ (EC 2010). Although the required level 
of agreement for a global FTT has yet to materialise, 
the Commission has nevertheless decided to change its 
position and press ahead with a European FTT on the 
grounds that if a transactions tax is the best possible 
method of taxing the financial sector in the post-crisis 
period then everything should be done to win interna-
tional agreement for the tax. 
The Commission is right to rest its case for the FTT 
on a matter of principle rather than on considerations of 
expediency. However, its argument raises the question 
of whether the FTT is in fact the most effective method 
of taxing the financial sector. Recall the Commission’s 
claim that the FTT’s advantage over the FAT is that it can 
achieve two objectives simultaneously: market stabilisa-
tion in addition to revenue generation. The central idea 
behind this claim is that there is a positive correlation 
between trading volume and price volatility: by reducing 
the volume of short term trading the FTT can help to re-
duce price volatility, which must in turn help to promote 
the informational efficiency of the financial markets. As 
the Commission’s Impact Assessment study asserts: „The 
aspects of dealing with risk and behavioural aspects of the 
FTT relate to the possibility of the FTT to curb speculation, 
noise trading and technical trade, and to decrease market 
volatility“ (EC 2010, 10). The problem with this assertion 
is that it does not receive unambiguous support either 
from the empirical evidence or from economic theory. 
As concerns the former, some studies show a close cor-
relation between trading volume and price volatility, but 
others show no such correlation. As concerns the latter, 
while some economists argue that excessive trading can 
cause price volatility, others put the contrary argument 
that too little trading can cause prices to be more volatile 
than usual because of ‘market thinning’5. 
In sum, the Commission’s case for the FTT is not a 
powerful, and certainly not a unanimous one. However, 
if the Commission persists with this tax policy this is in 
large part because the standard arguments against the 
FTT also lack sufficient power6. Whatever the differences 
between the critics and supporters of the FTT regarding 
the merits of speculative trading, both sides in the debate 
essentially agree that most short term trades are specula-
tive in nature. This consensus explains why all current 
assessments of the costs and benefits of the FTT only 
focus on its impact on financial market stability that is 
transmitted via its impact on financial prices while largely 
ignoring the impact on stability that is transmitted via 
its impact on financial institutions, or through dampened 
liquidity. This paper takes a different position. While it 
may be that a significant amount of short term trading is 
speculative, it is also the case that an equally significant 
amount has nothing to do with speculation and instead 
forms an indispensable part of the daily operations of 
major institutions such as pension and mutual funds on 
the one hand and the commercial banks on the other. It 
thus follows that any complete assessment of the costs 
and benefits of the FTT must also focus on its impact on 
these institutions. 
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3. Capital market taxes and the asset management 
function.
When one looks at recent trends in equity market trading 
one can understand why the Commission has singled out 
high frequency trading (HFT) for special attention when 
making its case for the FTT. As can be seen in figure 1, 
while trading volumes in the world’s largest equity mar-
kets grew steadily between the early 1990s and the mid-
2000s, there was a sharp upward spike in volumes after 
this point before they again fell after the financial crisis. 
There is no doubt that this upward spike was in large part 
caused by the advent of high frequency trading. Although 
the electronification of securities trading dates from the 
early 1970s with the formation of NASDAQ in the US, it 
was not until the 1990s that securities trading in the EU 
area began to grow in fully automated exchanges and it 
is not until the mid-2000s that HFT became established 
as a significant proportion of automated trading (Gomber 
et.al., 2011).
Two concessions are made here. First, that HFT is 
purely speculative in nature as can be seen from the list 
of its defining characteristics presented in the bottom 
right box in figure 2, and, second, that the imposition of 
the FTT will certainly help to curb HFT. However, we 
also ask two questions that are never raised by the Com-
mission. The first is what is the percentage share of high 
frequency trading out of all automated trading? The com-
mission’s proposal for the FTT gives the impression that 
HFT is the dominant form of automated trading, but 
while this may be true in the US where current estimates 
are that HFT account for 50 to 55% of all automated 
trading. The remainder is comprised of algorithmic trad-
ing. The estimates for the EU are that algorithmic trading 
continues to account for the majority share of automated 
trading, 70 to 75% (Valiante and Lanoo, 2011, p.36).
figure 2 algorithmic versus high frequency trading
Common for HFT and AT
1) Pre-designed trading decisions
2) Used by professional traders
3) Observing market data in real-time
4) Automated order submission
5) Automated order management
6) Without human intervention
7) Use of direct markets access
Specific for AT excl. HFT
1) Agent trading
2) Minimise market impact (large 
orders)
3) Goal is to achieve a particular  
benchmark
4) Holding periods: days/weeks/
months
5) Working order through time and 
across markets
Specific for HFT
1) Very high number of orders
2) Rapid order cancellation
3) Proprietary trading
4) Profit from buying and selling
5) No signification position at 
day’s end
6) Very short holding periods
7) Extracting very low margins 
per trade
8) Low latency requirement
9) Use of co-location
10) Focus on high liquid instruments
Source: Gomber et.al. (2011)
The second question is who are the agents engaging in 
algorithmic and high frequency trading respectively? The 
fact that the Commission singles out HFT for special 
mention when discussing automated trading may give the 
impression that its other important subset, algorithmic 
trading, is not all that different from HFT either in terms 
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of the trading players involved or in terms of the central 
trading purpose. This impression is wrong. While algo-
rithmic and HFT have several common characteristics by 
virtue of being subsets of automated trading (as shown 
in the top half of figure 2) the differences between these 
two subsets are more important because they relate to two 
contrasting types of financial function performed by two 
contrasting types of financial institution. Where HFT is 
speculative trading conducted primarily by hedge funds 
and other proprietary trading vehicles, algorithmic trad-
ing is portfolio trading conducted by institutional asset 
managers and in particular by mutual funds. As the latter 
have a fairly long history one may well wonder why it is 
relatively recently that they have begun to use algorithmic 
forms of trading on so comprehensive a scale. The an-
swer lies in the new pressures on fund managers as much 
as in technological advances. Algorithmic trading, like 
HFT, is a recent phenomenon, but while new computer-
ised techniques have enabled its development, structural 
changes in the fund management industry have been its 
chief motivation. 
 It is a general rule that whenever an industry grows 
in scale there is a corresponding shift towards more 
standardized forms of provision in order to accommo-
date increased demands while containing costs. The fund 
management industry is no exception. In place of the 
broad based and discretionally managed portfolio that 
was previously the norm, what is now more typical is 
the narrow portfolio managed to a particular investment 
target. Indexation strategies are at the heart of the new 
approach to fund management, for it is by taking a mar-
ket or sub-market index as a benchmark, while varying 
tracking error limits, that a portfolio can assume the form 
of a standardized product carrying a specified set of risk-
return characteristics. The advantages arising out of the 
separation and narrowing of portfolios are two-fold: on 
the one hand there is better ‘risk-conservation’ as each 
additional unit of risk is matched more closely to a cor-
responding additional unit of return; on the other hand 
there is a more accurate measure of managerial perfor-
mance because it may be easier to assess this performance 
and avoid confusing high returns based on risk from 
those which reflect superior knowledge and judgement. 
The rise in algorithmic trading closely ties in with the 
increasing standardization of fund management because 
it helps managers to resolve a trading dilemma that has 
become particularly acute with this development. On the 
one hand trading for portfolio balancing purposes has 
greatly intensified: where trading was previously an exog-
enous activity in that while required to set up a portfolio 
it was not subsequently necessary to the latter’s mainte-
nance, trading has now become an endogenous activity, 
necessary for keeping a portfolio to a specified invest-
ment target. Algorithmic trading facilitates this need for 
constant portfolio rebalancing by helping to speed up 
the execution of institutional orders. On the other hand, 
trading can be very costly even while it is unavoidable: the 
trading of large institutional orders can cause price dis-
turbances that then create opportunities for poachers to 
front-run the orders and thereby raise trading costs. Insti-
tutional investors have traditionally sought to minimize 
the price impact of their trades by slicing large ‘parent’ 
orders into many smaller ‘child’ orders that are then fed 
through the exchanges. Algorithmic trading facilitates 
this price impact minimization by helping managers to 
determine how best to slice large orders into smaller or-
ders and where best to execute these orders. 
In sum, algorithmic trading is ‘portfolio-serving’, 
trading to keep a portfolio to its benchmark, in contrast 
to high frequency trading that is ‘self-serving’, trading 
purely aimed at making a profit. However, a further im-
portant thing to note here is that HFT is not only fun-
damentally antithetical to algorithmic trading but is also 
parasitic on the latter. Where institutional asset manag-
ers typically engage in algorithmic trading to avoid price 
volatility and thus avoid giving profitable opportunities 
to poachers, the hedge funds and other speculative vehi-
cles on the contrary are the poachers and engage in HFT 
precisely in order to feed off any price volatility caused 
by institutional trading. This is why HFT concentrates 
on large cap liquid securities, those that dominate the 
indexes used by the mutual and pension funds as their 
benchmarks, and this is why hedge funds place their 
computers in close proximity to those used by the mu-
tual funds in the major trading venues (a practice known 
as ‘co-location’).
The upshot of the above discussion is that the imposi-
tion of the FTT in the secondary equity markets would be 
self defeating. The tax would certainly succeed in curbing 
HFT but in doing so it will also harm algorithmic trading 
on which HFT is parasitic. To use an analogy, it is like 
giving a pet dog that has fleas so strong a medicine that 
it also kills the dog: effective for the fleas but pointless 
overall. It could of course be argued that this negative side 
effect may be a price worth paying if HFT volumes can 
be significantly reduced. However, this argument would 
only hold if the current trends in portfolio management 
that give rise to algorithmic trading as an indispensable 
activity were themselves not an irreversible aspect of the 
contemporary European financial landscape. The reality 
is that they are. The greater the pressures on government 
finances, which have been further severely stretched by 
the financial crisis, the greater are the government incen-
tives to force increasing numbers of middle and higher 
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income households to make their own arrangements for 
supplementary pension and other welfare provision. The 
greater the drive towards welfare arrangements focussed 
on protecting lower-income groups and moving them 
towards median positions, the greater will be the cor-
responding demands made upon the asset management 
industry and the greater therefore is this industry’s drive 
towards standardization as a means of coping with these 
demands. Thus algorithmic trading is set to continue to 
expand in importance given the ongoing shift towards 
the standardization asset management and given the 
endogeneity of trading to portfolios that track market 
indexes. 
4. Money market taxes and the banking function.
Trading volumes in the money markets, like those in the 
capital markets, have in recent decades grown at rates far 
in excess of what can be meaningfully explained in terms 
of real sector activities for which reason the Commis-
sion has proposed to bring all money market instruments 
under the scope of the FTT. In our view, this proposal 
is wrong because the growth of money market trading 
has principally been powered by inter-bank transactions 
that have been linked to the pressures on the banking 
function emanating from the securities markets. The 
rapid development and international integration of the 
money markets is a direct consequence of the increased 
role of institutional investors and the accompanying shift 
away from classical bank intermediation towards greater 
use of the security markets. This shift is not going to 
be reversed. On the one hand such a move would frag-
ment financial systems at a time when economic systems 
are increasingly integrated. On the other hand, tighter 
regulatory constraints on banks will require them to 
reduce their use of leverage and this in turn will mean 
that they hold fewer long-term assets and make more use 
of securitisation. The higher capital ratios to which the 
banking system is moving are already making it more 
advantageous to distribute loans via the security markets 
and disadvantageous to hold them to maturity. Thus large 
banks and security markets will continue to function in 
symbiosis, with the banks performing many functions 
tied to the security markets and especially supplying the 
transactions balances needed by the agents trading secu-
rities. The money market is a key point of tension in this 
function because of „the paradox of disintermediation“7: 
money is less and less held as an asset but is increasingly 
needed as a means of exchange to support the growing 
volume of security trading. The money market resolves 
the paradox by accelerating interbank transactions to an 
astonishing degree: huge sums are transferred from bank 
to bank at enormous speed and at very low cost. 
Inter-bank transactions essentially take two forms: 
unsecured (i.e no use of backing collateral) and secured 
(i.e use of backing collateral). As unsecured borrowing 
involves more risk to lenders, this is typically confined 
to the very shortest of time spans. This said, it should be 
noted that after the recent financial crisis where the trust 
between banks has become more fragile, the proportion 
of unsecured borrowing and lending activity has fallen in 
favour of securitised forms of activity (see figure 3). The 
principal form of securitised borrowing is the repo: the 
sale of collateral such as government bonds for cash, and 
the repurchase of these same bonds with cash. Now it is 
figure 3 average daily turnover in various money market segments (index: unsecured transaction volume in 2002 = 100)
Source: ECB (2011)
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proposed to apply the FTT to repos on the grounds that 
a) they are ‘transactions’ inasmuch as they involve the 
sale and purchase of securities and b) these transactions 
are typically short term and hence presumably speculative 
in nature. This is illogical. Not only did the inter-bank 
money market break down during the crisis but there 
also subsequently occurred an even deeper and more 
comprehensive breakdown in Europe as a consequence 
of the sovereign debt crisis. This impairment of the money 
market can only be aggravated by the proposed tax on 
repo transactions. The suggested rate of 10 basis points 
is much greater than the interest charged on most repos 
because they are short-run credits meant only to finance 
rapidly executed portfolio changes. In consequence the 
inter-bank market would be seriously attenuated, and se-
curity markets affected by the reduced availability and in-
creased cost of transactions balances. Since, as was argued 
in section 3, much of the trading in securities markets is 
economically functional and since increased constraints 
on the banks will make economies more dependent on 
these markets, the application of the FTT to inter-bank 
loans is likely to be economically damaging.
The illogicality in the Commission’s position is fur-
ther compounded by the fact that it does not intend to 
extend the FTT to cover foreign exchange swaps. These 
foreign exchange (FX) instruments, which combine spot 
FX transactions with outright forward transactions, ac-
count for about 50% of all daily FX trading that is now 
in the region of $5 trillion. The major users of FX swaps 
are the dealing banks, and one main motivation is that 
these instruments represent a cheap, because collateral-
ised, form of borrowing a foreign currency; thus when a 
eurozone bank wants to borrow dollars short term, it is 
cheaper to do so through an FX swap, selling euros for 
dollars in a spot transaction and repurchasing the euros 
with dollars in the reverse forward transaction. However, 
a more important reason why banks use FX swaps is that 
these serve as an alternative type of repo: a Eurozone bank 
wanting to borrow euros can either engage in a straight-
forward repo transaction – using government bonds as 
collateral – or in an FX swap – selling dollars for euros 
and then repurchasing the dollars with euros, the point 
here being that dollars not government securities act as 
the collateral. 
Now there is already a perceived tendency to supple-
ment ordinary repo transactions with FX swaps on the 
part of eurozone banks because of the increasing shortage 
of good quality government bonds to serve as collateral. 
Following the introduction of euro, the world’s investors 
did for a time treat all Eurozone government bonds as a 
more or less homogenous class because of the elimination 
of currency risk, a development that became manifest in 
the narrowing of government yield spreads. With the ad-
vent of the sovereign debt crisis and the consequent rise in 
credit risk considerations in the minds of bond investors 
these yield spreads have again widened as the Eurozone 
government bond market again fragmented into heter-
ogeneous groups. Among the best quality government 
bonds are those of the German government but these 
are in short supply due to the heavy pressure of demand 
from investors seeking a safe haven (according to a recent 
survey on the European repo market (ICMA, 2012), the 
share of German government bonds as collateral in repo 
transactions fell from 22.4% in June 2011 to 20.7% in 
June 2012). As a result, the Eurozone banks have had to 
find alternative assets to use as collateral, including the 
US dollar. A measure of the extent to which these banks 
rely on FX swaps less for currency related than for repo 
type borrowings is indicated by the unusually high ratio 
of inter-dealer FX transactions in the euro area: 64% 
(67% for FX swaps) as compared with a rest of the world 
average of 39% (ECB, 2010).
Given that the Commission proposes to tax repos but 
not FX swaps, the use of these instruments as alternative 
credit transactions to the repo will increase further, thus 
boosting the already large FX swap daily volume. This is 
ironic because the original Tobin tax that gave inspiration 
to all subsequent financial transaction tax proposals was 
specifically directed at FX transactions but here we have a 
situation where the Commission’s imposition of the FTT 
on ordinary repos will help to swell FX transactions by 
conferring a tax advantage on them. It was because they 
recognised this anomaly that members of the European 
Parliament voted in May 2012 to bring ‘currency spot 
transactions’ under the scope of the FTT8. However, the 
fact that the European Parliament did not vote to also 
bring FX swaps (or outright forward currency transac-
tions) under the scope of the FTT only served to further 
highlight the inconsistency in the Commission’s proposal 
to tax one form of collateral (repos) but not another (US 
dollars). This inconsistency is the most worrying feature 
of the FTT and is likely to make it unworkable as an EU 
strategy because it would both further undermine the 
liquidity of euro-denominated bond markets and make 
the liquidity of the European banking system completely 
dependent on credit conditions in the US.
A final important observation to make here is that 
the weakening of the inter-bank money market also has 
serious implications for the implementation of monetary 
policy. Monetary policy today relies on the existence of an 
integrated money market, which gives the central bank’s 
actions in that market macroeconomic significance. This 
is one reason the ECB is trying to end the exclusion of 
banking systems in the periphery from the money mar-
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ket – until it does so the transmission of monetary policy 
decisions will be partial and uneven. Indeed, if integral 
money markets cannot be restored then monetary policy 
will be ineffective. In the first instance the central bank 
will have to engage in separate negotiations with each 
fraction of the divided market and have to judge what the 
effect of this multiplicity of individual interventions will 
be. Furthermore, the efficacy of monetary policy depends 
on the existence of an elastic supply of credit; monetary 
policy affects the terms on which that credit is issued. If 
banks and other financial corporations find that credit 
is not available, then they will accumulate big money 
balances to reduce the risk of not being able to carry 
out their desired transactions. Once financial agents have 
insulated themselves from the credit system in this way 
they have also insulated themselves against central bank 
actions – since they are not making use of the money 
market, changes in money market conditions have no 
clear impact on their own strategies.
5. Policy Implications
As the economic rationale for the FTT is extremely weak, 
it follows that the rationale for the tax has ultimately to 
rest on political considerations. The key political problem 
is the conflict between strong popular demands for a tax 
on banks and the equally strong opposition to any form 
of bank taxation mounted by the banks themselves. The 
Commission appears to have decided that the FTT rep-
resents the most judicious way of resolving this conflict 
because on the one side it has become fixed in popular 
opinion through its association with the Tobin tax and 
because on the other this tax represents less of a threat to 
banks’ interests as compared with a FAT. This is not only 
because the FAT is a direct tax on bank profits unlike 
the FTT that taxes trading activities that only form part 
of the source of profits. It is also because the FAT can 
be focussed on specific institutions unlike the FTT that 
indiscriminately affects all types of institution engaging 
in the transactions that are subject to this tax. The banks, 
as explained, may be the institutions most affected by a 
FTT in the money markets, but in the capital markets 
where it is the large fund managers who do most of the 
trading it is these non-bank institutions that will be most 
affected. In the end, the banks prefer the FTT as the least 
threatening form of taxation because they know that it 
will be eventually repealed not only because of the refusal 
of some national authorities to implement the tax but also 
because of the strong objections to it that are raised by 
the European fund management industry on account of 
its negative impact on portfolio rebalancing transactions. 
Aside from this point, there are two further reasons why 
the mutual fund and insurance company sectors will raise 
strong objections to the FTT.
The first is that the fund management sector neither 
caused the financial crisis nor benefitted from any of the 
government financial assistance that was given in the af-
termath of the crisis. While certain non-bank financial 
institutions, notably the hedge funds, may have been to 
some extent complicit in precipitating the subprime crisis 
that subsequently mutated into a full blown financial cri-
sis, the pension and mutual fund sector could reasonably 
argue that their role in that initial crisis was more that 
of the victim than that of the perpetrator. The second 
reason for this sector’s opposition to the FTT is that short 
term trading was not a root cause of the last financial 
crisis and thus its curtailment will not necessarily help 
to prevent a future financial crisis. The Commission ar-
gues that the FTT would „complement regulatory measures 
aimed at avoiding future crises“ (2011a, 2) but the fact is 
that trading played no major role in the last financial cri-
sis. The products at the epicentre of the initial subprime 
phase of the crisis were collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs), credit instruments that were so complex and 
opaque in structure that they could not be easily traded 
and priced according to any market standard. Indeed, 
it was precisely because they were difficult to price and 
consequently difficult to trade that these products helped 
to precipitate the breakdown in trust between banks that 
in turn caused the money and interbank markets to freeze 
up completely in August, 2007. In this second phase of 
the financial crisis, trading was again to play no major 
role. Rather, that role belonged to the huge asset-liability 
mismatches of the bank owned conduits and structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs). Thus while it was indeed the 
case that the ‘particularly risky behaviour’ on the part of 
the banks and other segments of the financial markets 
was a root cause of the financial crisis, that risky be-
haviour had less to do with financial trading than with 
excessive leverage and capital inadequacy.
The above observations mean that the Commission’s 
logic behind its choice of the FTT as the preferred means 
of taxing the European financial sector can be stood on its 
head. If the intention behind a European financial tax is 
not only to force financial institutions to bear some of the 
costs of the last financial crisis but also to force changes 
in their behaviour so as to prevent a future financial crisis 
then it is not the FTT but the FAT that is superior. The 
explanation is clear. If it is the prospect of distributing 
huge financial profits in the form of generous salaries and 
bonuses that is the chief motivation for excessive leverage 
and other types of excessive risk taking in the financial 
sector, then it must follow that the most effective way of 
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dealing with this problem is to tax financial profits before 
they can be distributed. 
Conclusion
There is a widely held view that as long as the banks are 
taxed to help repay some of the vast sums of taxpayers’ 
money they have absorbed since the crisis, it does not re-
ally matter what type of tax policy is applied. This paper 
has argued that it does matter enormously what sort of 
tax or revenue arrangements are applied to finance. Ap-
ply the wrong tax and the objective of getting the bank-
ing sector to shoulder its part of the post-crisis financial 
burden will ultimately fail. While the analysis developed 
here suggests that the challenges of seeking some share 
in the wealth created and transmitted through financial 
markets (especially in the wake of the large amounts of 
national wealth pledged to bail out banks and some fi-
nancial institutions) is not adequately captured by the 
current focus, the better tax is the financial activities tax 
because the better strategy for raising public revenues is 
to tax the immense private fortunes that have been ac-
cumulated by the very same abuse of financial and cor-
porate power that has rendered democratic governments 
insolvent. It is hard to deny that a FAT would perform 
this necessary redistributive function far more effectively 
than a FTT. 
7. Grahl and Lysandrou, 2003.
8. European Parliament, Legislative proposal to implement enhanced 
cooperation in the area of financial transactions tax (FTT), Febru-
ary, 2013.
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